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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, **Princeton University**, USA 2017 – present
M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), **New Economic School**, Moscow, Russia 2014 – 2016
B.A. in Economics (cum laude), **M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University**, Moscow, Russia 2010 – 2014

RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS

Primary **Microeconomic Theory**
Secondary **Behavioral Economics, Political Economy**

PUBLISHED PAPERS

- **Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information** (with Marcelo A. Fernandez and Leeat Yariv)
American Economic Review: Insights, Volume 4(1), 18-33.
Abstract. We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

WORKING PAPERS

- **Fragile Stable Matchings** (draft available upon request)
Abstract. We study decentralized one-to-one matching markets. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) showed that for any unstable matching, there are simple dynamics generating a stable one. Nonetheless, stable outcomes are fragile. First, we prove that any stable matching can be attained using these dynamics from any unstable one under mild conditions. Next, we quantify fragility. We show markets in which (i) some stable matchings are more robust than others; (ii) extremal stable matchings are most fragile; (iii) all stable matchings are fragile. Finally, even in markets with unique stable matchings, re-equilibration usually takes a long time and involves many market participants unmatched and rematched for a substantial number of periods. We prove that the addition of a small fraction of market participants can make stabilization dynamics in the new market take an exponentially long time for almost any perturbation.
- **Dominance Solvability in Random Games** (with Noga Alon and Leeat Yariv)
Abstract. We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player's actions grows. Furthermore, conditional on dominance solvability, the number of iterations required to converge to Nash equilibrium grows rapidly as action sets grow. Nonetheless, at least when one of the players has a small action set, iterated elimination simplifies the game substantially by ruling out a sizable fraction of actions. This is no longer the case as both players' action sets expand. Technically, we illustrate the usefulness of recent combinatorial methods for the analysis of general games.

WORK IN PROGRESS

- **Fragile Stable Supply Chain Networks**
- **Searching by Trial and Error with Correlated Sources**

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Prof. Leeat Yariv, Princeton University	Spring 2020
Junior Research Fellow at Centre for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow, Russia	Fall 2016
Research Assistant for Profs. Andrei Markevich and Konstantin Sonin, New Economic School	Summer 2016

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Princeton University	TA, <i>Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach</i> [UG] for Prof. Can Urgun	2020-2021
	TA, <i>Microeconomic Theory</i> [UG] for Prof. Andrea Wilson	Fall 2019
New Economic School	TA, <i>Microeconomics I–V</i> [G], <i>Microeconomics in Finance</i> [G], <i>Political Economics II</i> [G], <i>Institutional Economics</i> [G], <i>Asset Pricing</i> [G], <i>Investments</i> [G], <i>Decision Theory</i> [UG]	2015 – 2017

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Referee for	<i>American Economic Review</i> , <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics</i> , <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>
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AWARDS

Stephen Goldfeld Memorial Graduate Summer Fellowship	2021
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Research Grant	2020-2022
Richard S. Simmons '51 Graduate Fellowship	2018
Princeton University Graduate Fellowship	2017-2022
Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, New Economic School	2016-2017
Don Patinkin Prize	2016
Outstanding Student Paper Award, Outstanding Student in Data Analysis Award, Outstanding Student in Finance Award, New Economic School	2016
New Economic School Academic Fellowship	2014-2016

OTHER

Citizenship	Russia	
NBA Hackathon	Second Place Team, Basketball Analytics	2019
	Finalist Team, Basketball Analytics	2017-2018