I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Economics at Princeton University. My research is in microeconomic theory, with a focus on market design and robustness.
I will be available for interviews during the 2022/2023 job market.
Publications
Abstract. We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.
Working Papers
Abstract. This paper shows the fragility of stable matchings in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting. The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics in which randomly-chosen blocking pairs match successively. Such decentralized interactions guarantee convergence to a stable matching. Our first theorem shows that, under mild conditions, any unstable matching—including a small perturbation of a stable matching—can culminate in any stable matching through these dynamics. Our second theorem highlights another aspect of fragility: stabilization may take a long time. Even in markets with a unique stable matching, where the dynamics always converge to the same matching, decentralized interactions can require an exponentially long duration to converge. A small perturbation of a stable matching may lead the market away from stability and involve a sizable proportion of mismatched participants for extended periods.
Abstract. We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player's actions grows. Furthermore, conditional on dominance solvability, the number of iterations required to converge to Nash equilibrium grows rapidly as action sets grow. Nonetheless, when games are highly imbalanced, iterated elimination simplifies the game substantially by ruling out a sizable fraction of actions. Technically, we illustrate the usefulness of recent combinatorial methods for the analysis of general games.
Abstract. This paper proposes simple dynamics generating a stable supply chain network. We prove that for any unstable network, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blocking chains leading to a stable network. Our proof suggests an algorithm for finding a stable network that generalizes the classical Gale and Shapley (1962)’s deferred acceptance algorithm.
Work in Progress